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ABSTRACT 
 
We extend the mixed-motives model of transfer derivatives developed by Cox et al 
(2004) introducing subjectively-assessed recipient need in place of an absolute income 
threshold at which the donor’s dominant motive switches from altruism to exchange. 
This refinement provides a theoretically justifiable threshold amenable to empirical 
measurement. We test the extended model with customized survey data from Tonga 
and find evidence consistent with Cox et al in support of altruism for households 
below the threshold, but, we also find a positive, exchange-motivated relationship for 
those above the threshold. We conclude that either crowding-out or crowding-in of 
private transfers can occur when the recipient’s welfare improves, depending on the 
household’s pre-transfer welfare level. This also has implications for the distributional 
impact of private transfers and could explain why poverty reduction can be 
accompanied by increased income inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In an important departure from earlier models of private transfer derivatives Cox and 
others introduced a mixed-motives model (Cox, 1987; Cox, Eser and Jimenez, 1998; 
Cox, Hansen and Jimenez, 2004). For them, the donor’s transfers are driven by both 
altruism and exchange motives. At low income levels below some threshold altruism 
is the dominant motive and the relationship between the recipient’s income and the 
level of transfers is negative. Once the threshold level is reached and the exchange 
motive takes over, the relationship changes. The main implication is the hypothesized 
non-linear relationship between transfers and recipient income. They test their model 
by estimating a spline function as opposed to the conventional linear model, using 
data from the Philippines. Their spline model uncovers a much stronger, negative 
relationship for pre-transfer recipient income below the threshold than that estimated 
in previous studies. They thus conclude that crowding-out of private transfers is likely 
to thwart public welfare programs for the poor.1 
 
Given the absence of the required information to determine, a priori, the threshold 
level of income at which to set the knot-point of their spline function, Cox et al (2004) 
estimate their model using non-linear least squares (NLLS), treating the threshold 
income level as an unknown. In defence of this approach they argue that because the 
estimated threshold was very close to the official poverty line for the Philippines, it 
could be interpreted as a reasonable indicator of the households’ perceived’ threshold 
poverty line; that is, as some form of subjectively-assessed ‘minimum consumption 
bundle’ (Cox et al; p.2210). The case for a transfer derivatives model based on 
recipients’ subjectively-assessed needs is appealing. However, their assumption of a 
subjectively-assessed threshold set at some absolute income level that is common 
across all households is difficult to justify theoretically which they acknowledge as 
one of the limitations imposed by their dataset (p.2215).  
 
In this paper we extend the mixed-motives model by incorporating explicitly, 
subjectively-assessed recipient need in place of a given, absolute income threshold at 
which the donor’s dominant motive switches from altruism to exchange. This 
                                                 
1 See Gibson et al (2006) and Kazianga (2006) who also test empirically mixed-motive models of transfers. 
In neither case do they find evidence of both motives.   
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refinement has the advantage of providing a theoretically justifiable basis for setting 
the knot-point of the estimated spline function that is both consistent with recent 
literature on relative deprivation and subjective welfare, and amenable to empirical 
measurement independently of the econometric estimation of the model. 
 
We then test the extended mixed-motives model with household data from Tonga 
based on a customized questionnaire that included questions specifically to gauge 
households’ self-assessed ‘adequate’ level of income. When we estimate the mixed-
motives model using our Subjective Income Gap variant we also find evidence of a 
strong negative relationship for income levels below the threshold level, but, in 
addition, we find a statistically significant positive relationship between transfers and 
recipients’ welfare for income levels above the threshold level. This we interpret as 
evidence of the exchange motive dominating transfer behavior once the welfare of the 
household ceases to be the main concern of the donor. Furthermore, when we re-
estimate the spline function using the same dataset but with the threshold income level 
set as a constant across all households, as in Cox et al (2004), it is found that the 
estimated coefficients for the spline are substantially smaller and no longer 
statistically significant. These findings lead us to conclude that either crowding-out or 
crowding-in of private transfers can occur when recipient welfare improves, 
depending on where the household’s pre-transfer welfare level is in relation to the 
subjectively-assessed threshold level. This also has implications for the distributional 
impact of private transfers and could explain why programs of effective poverty 
alleviation are often accompanied by increased income inequality. 
 
Section 2 presents the econometric specification of the extended mixed-motives model 
and shows how subjectively-assessed need is formally introduced. Section 3 presents 
some descriptive data from the Tongan survey and discusses the econometric 
estimations, including an instrumental variable strategy to test for potential 
endogeneity. In section 4 conclusions are presented. 
 
2. Model Specification 
 
The concept of ‘subjective welfare’ and models of private transfers motivated by 
recipient households’ subjectively-assessed need, rather than by some externally-
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derived ‘objective’ poverty line, is not new to the income transfers literature.2 
Kaufman and Lindauer (1986) for instance posit and test empirically a model of 
private transfers in which they introduce the notion of a ‘required’ income level that 
varies across households belonging to different reference groups or ‘networks’.3 
However, this model assumes a single dominant altruism motive and does not allow 
for a switch to the exchange motive once the threshold welfare level is reached.  
 
A subjectively-assessed measure of welfare provides an obvious and explicit threshold 
welfare level for determining, in a mixed-motives model, the knot-point at which the 
donor’s dominant motive switches from altruism to exchange. Below this threshold, 
altruistic concerns prevail because the donor regards the household’s pre-transfer 
income to be inadequate to provide for the required standard of living. It is then 
reasonable to assume that transfers are aimed at increasing the household’s welfare. 
For this reason the recipient household’s participation constraint will be non-binding 
in the altruistically-driven donor’s program. At pre-transfer income levels above the 
threshold the donor has no reason to be concerned about the recipient household’s 
level of welfare, which is deemed adequate. Here the exchange motive becomes 
dominant at the margin. Under exchange the recipient household’s participation 
constraint will be binding in the donor’s program.  
 
If, for each household, the subjectively-assessed needs and associated threshold 
income level are known, the main regressor in the model can be expressed as the 
difference between the respective household’s threshold and pre-transfer welfare level. 
From the donor’s point of view the recipient household’s utility becomes a function of 
a variable (which we label CGAPh) that measures the difference between the 
household’s actual consumption levels (Ch) and a ‘subjective living norm’ (Ah). The 
basic elements of the donor’s maximization program in the model of Cox et al (2004) 
therefore remain unchanged, but with the household’s absolute level of pre-transfer 
consumption substituted by a new subjective welfare variable CGAPh . The extended 
model can be re-written: 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical and applied literature on private transfers see Cox and 
Fafchamps (2008).  
3 For a comprehensive discussion of the issue of subjectively-assessed poverty and/or relative deprivation in 
the economics literature see for instance Easterlin, (1995) Blanchflower and Oswald (2004); Fafchamps and 
Shilpi (2008).  
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where,   
Ud = donor’s utility 
T = transfers provided by the donor to the recipient household 
S = services provided to recipient household to the donor 
Cd = donor’s consumption 
V = recipient household’s utility from the donor’s point of view 
CGAPh = recipient household’s subjective consumption gap 
 
The equivalent of this variable in income terms is the ‘Subjective Income Gap’ (we 
use the acronym IGAPh, that is, the difference between household income from all 
sources (Yh), and what the household and donor consider the amount required for an 
adequate standard of living (Imin). In effect, the predictions of the mixed-motives 
model of Cox et al (2004) regarding the relationship between household welfare and 
transfers remain the same, but with a theoretically justifiable knot-point for the spline 
function, where IGAPh is equal to zero. We label this the ‘Subjective Income Gap’ 
model, as distinct from the original formulation of Cox et al which we label here the 
‘Absolute Income’ model. 
 
The hypothesized relationship between transfers and IGAP is depicted in Figure 1. For 
the ‘subjective poor’ households, that is those with a negative IGAP, transfers are 
hypothesized to be driven by altruism. However once the threshold K is reached, at 
IGAP equal to zero, transfers become exchange driven and the relationship is 
positive.4  
 
Following Cox et al (2004), a spline rather than linear specification for the subjective 
income gap variable is used in formulating the transfers equation (1). Formally, the 
objective is to estimate the following transfers equation: 
Ti = iiiiiii udKKIGAPIGAPZX +−++++ *)[(54321 βββββ     (2)   
 
                                                 
4 Cox et al (2004) show that under exchange transfers could increase or decrease with recipient pre-transfer 
income, depending on the donor’s price elasticity of demand for the household’s services. If it is assumed 
that there is no close market substitute for the household’s services, the donor’s demand for these services is 
likely to be relatively price inelastic in which case a positive relationship between the recipient’s income 
and the donor’s transfers can be expected 
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Where: 
 Ti = international transfers received by the household5  
Xi = Vector of household variables 
Zi = Vector of migrant variables 
IGAPi = Household subjective income gap = actual income less required income 
Ki = Knot-point = 0 
dKi = 1 if IGAPi >= Ki, 0 otherwise 
 
 
Figure 1 Relationship between Transfers and the Subjective Income Gap 
 
3. Data and econometric estimation 
 
The survey data 
We use data from a customized household survey designed and implemented by the 
authors as part of a World Bank study in 2005 in the South Pacific island country of 
Tonga.6 Tonga is a relatively poor country with a virtually non-existent public welfare 
system and with households highly dependent on private transfer income, almost 
exclusively from international migrants. The sections of the survey on household 
income and transfers applied to the year 2004, and included the ‘minimum income 
question’, which asked the respondent about the amount of cash income that “a 
                                                 
5 As the survey did not collect data on the transfers of each individual donor this study focuses on total 
transfers received by households from international migrants. 
6 For details of this survey  and a more extensive discusión of the descriptive data see World Bank (2006). 
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household like yours’ would require just to get by.” This question was included 
specifically to allow for the empirical estimation of a knot-point for the spline 
function in a mixed-motives model. The survey also collected information on crops, 
livestock and fishing activities which was used to estimate household subsistence 
income. This was added to the required cash income estimate to derive the 
household’s total minimum required minimum income. This was then used as the 
threshold income level to calculate, for each household, the subjective income gap 
variable (IGAP).  
 
In total 500 households were sampled. As expected, the survey data revealed a high 
incidence of migrant households (58%). Almost 90 per cent of households received 
transfers from international migrants, indicating that many households without 
migrants also benefited from migrant transfers. The mean level of transfers received 
by receiving households in 2004 was U$3,067. As expected higher levels of transfers 
were reported by households with at least one international migrant; U$3,900 
compared to U$1,597 for households without a migrant.  
 
Table 1 shows the mean levels of transfers for households in the poorest 40%, the 
middle 40% and the richest 20%, categorized in accordance with the size of the 
subjective income gap variable (IGAP), on the one hand, and the absolute income 
level on the other. As predicted by our modified version of the mixed-motives model, 
the poorest 40% of those classified using IGAP reported average transfers per 
household substantially higher ($3,281) than those in the middle 40% group 
($1,819).7 When comparing the transfers received by the middle and richest IGAP 
groups, it can be seen that the latter were 47% higher.8  
                                                
 
In comparison, when households are classified according to absolute income rather 
than subjective income gap, the poorest 40% reported mean transfers only slightly 
higher (not statistically significant) than those in the middle income category.9 
Transfers to the richest 20% were only 24% higher than those observed for 
 
7 Difference significant at the 1% level: t-statistic =4.56, degrees of freedom = 398, p-value 0.000. 
8 Difference significant at the 1% level: t-statistic =3.30, degrees of freedom = 298, p-value 0.000. 
9 Difference not statistically significant at conventional levels: t-statistic =0.32, degrees of freedom = 398, 
p-value 0.376. 
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households in the middle income category.10 These differences suggest that the 
Subjective Income Gap variant of the mixed motives model might better uncover the 
donors’ mixed motives than the Absolute Income version of Cox et al (2004). 
 
Table 1 Transfers Received by Income Category  
(US$, 2004) 
Mean Household Transfers Received*  
Household Category Subjective Income Gap Absolute Income  
 
Poorest 40% 3,280.6 
(3,968.4) 
 
2,629.0 
(3,433.0) 
 
Middle 40% 
 
1,819.0 
(2,197.2) 
2,523.4 
(3,229.4) 
 
Richest 20% 
 
3,448.5 
(6,273.8) 
3,343.1 
(6,196.0) 
*Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
A description of the variables used in the empirical estimation is provided in Table 2 
and their means and standard deviations are reported in Table 3. 
 
Four alternative econometric models were estimated. In the first two models the main 
regressor is the IGAP variable. The second set of models follows Cox et al (2004), in 
which the principal regressor is the absolute income level of the recipient household. 
Within each of these models we estimate two specifications; a linear and a non-linear, 
spline model for comparative purposes and to test the robustness of the results for our 
preferred IGAP model. For the IGAP model the theoretically specified knot-point is 
set at the threshold where actual income is equal to the household’s subjective 
‘required income’; i.e. where the variable IGAP is equal to zero. For the Absolute 
Income model11 the knot-point is set, following Cox et al (2004), at a fixed threshold 
                                                 
10 Difference statistically significant at the 10% level: t-statistic =1.51, degrees of freedom = 298, p-value 
0.07. 
11 The IGAP variable in the transfers equation (2) is substituted by the absolute level of household income 
(Y). In the remainder of this paper we refer to the two spline variables, ‘below the threshold’   as 4β  and 
‘above the threshold’ as 5β . 
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income level across all households, in this case at a household-level poverty line of 
US$3,757 per annum.12 
 
Table 2 Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable description 
Migrant transfers International transfers received by household in all forms, cash and in-kind 
( US$) 
Household income Total household income from all sources  excluding migrant transfers 
(US$) 
Subjective Income Gap 
(IGAP) 
Required income minus household income excluding migrant transfers 
(US$) 
Outer-island Dummy for household in outer-island (=1 if yes, otherwise 0) 
Household Size 
 
Number of household members, excluding migrants (No.) 
Major Social Ceremony 
 
Dummy for wedding or funeral in household (=1 if yes, otherwise 0) 
Migration Status Dummy for household with migrant overseas (=1 if yes, otherwise 0) 
Migrant Length of Stay   
 
Average length of stay of overseas migrants for the household (yrs) 
US Migrant Dummy for migrant in US (=1 if yes, otherwise 0) 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
---- not applicable 
 Sample (n = 500) Recipients ( n= 445) Non-Recipients (n = 55) 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Migrant transfers 2,729.55 4,070.89 3,066.91 4,193.80 0.00 0.00 
Household income 4,916.19 9,750.12 4,913.97 10,106.27 4,934.11 6,219.14 
Subjective Income Gap (IGAP) 799.01 9,275.72 699.77 9,635.65 1,602.01 5,561.26 
Outer-island 0.25 ---- 0.21 ---- 0.55 ---- 
Household Size 5.45 2.92 5.54 2.88 4.71 3.15 
Major Social Ceremony 0.07 ---- 0.07 ---- 0.09 ---- 
Migration Status 0.58 ---- 0.64 ---- 0.13 ---- 
Migrant Length of Stay 5.70 6.60 6.23 6.65 1.37 4.19 
US Migrant 0.26 ---- 0.28 ---- 0.07 ---- 
 
An explanation for the choice of control variables is in order. A dummy variable 
identifying households on the outer-islands was included to control for the cost of 
sending transfers to remote locations. Due to the negative cost-elasticity of 
remittances (Gibson et al, 2006), this variable is expected to have a negative effect on 
                                                 
12 We use instead an estimate of the household poverty line based on the median value of the households’ 
self-assessed ‘required income’ from our survey data as the knot-point of the spline function. We use this 
measure in line with the interpretation of the knot-point as a threshold poverty line ‘perceived by 
households’ as some form of subjectively-assessed ‘minimum consumption bundle’ (Cox et al, 2004; 
p.2210).  
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transfers received due to the higher cost of transfers for those not living on the main 
island. The model also controls for household size, as it is expected that the larger the 
household, the more requests for transfers the migrants will receive. Due to potential 
endogeneity concerns, this variable was excluded in alternative specifications and 
reassuringly the results did not change.13 A dummy variable identifying those 
households that had at least one of their members living abroad was also included. 
Although a high proportion of households without migrants also received transfers, 
preliminary descriptive analysis showed that the level of transfers received by 
households with international migrants is substantially higher (World Bank, 2006). 
 
To control for the income level of the donor, as we did not have data on the individual 
migrants’ income,14 we used the presence of migrants in the United States as a proxy. 
The US has traditionally been the preferred destination for Tongan migrants because it 
is often associated with higher levels of income than the other two common 
destinations, New Zealand and Australia (Lee, 2003). The model also controls for 
migrants’ length of stay abroad, as there is a general concern in the migration 
literature over so-called ‘remittance’ decay’. As major, financially-demanding social 
ceremonies such as weddings and funerals are of paramount importance in traditional 
societies like Tonga their occurrence is likely to induce additional transfers from 
migrants.15 A variable controlling for the occurrence of a wedding or funeral in the 
household in the year preceding the survey (2004) is included in the model.  
 
 Endogeneity testing 
We use instrumental variable techniques to test for possible endogeneity of the 
subjective income gap and absolute income variables in the linear specifications. The 
excluded instrument in both cases is a variable identifying the proportion of 
households in the community with their own flush toilet. We expect this variable to be 
correlated to household income and subjective income gap, implying that households 
living in communities where the use of flush toilet is more widespread would be more 
                                                 
13Available from the authors on request.  
14 As discussed in Kazianga (2006), if the incomes of donors and recipients are correlated, failing to control 
for the donor’s income could lead to omitted variable bias. See also Altonji et al (1997) where altruism is 
modelled and tested in relation to simultaneous changes in income of both  donor and recipient. 
15 Embarrassment, social ostracism and loss of prestige afflict households not able to comply with the local 
customs, resulting in households having to resort to excessive measures to cover such expenses (Krishna, 
2004). 
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likely to have higher levels of welfare as measured by income and subjective income 
gap (IGAP). We do not expect the proportion of households in the community with 
their own flush toilet to influence the amount of private transfers received, except 
indirectly through the household’s welfare. Moreover, we do not expect the 
instrument to be correlated with migrant transfers through some unobserved 
characteristics of the household, such as entrepreneurial capacities, by including a 
control for the presence of overseas migrants in the household. Appropriate statistical 
tests support the validity of this instrument in both models.16 The instrument was also 
found to be strong in both models, with a first-stage F-statistic17 of 22.2 for the IGAP 
model and 19.33 for the Absolute Income (Y) model. We also tested the hypothesis 
that the main variables of interest in each model (IGAP and Y) are not correlated with 
the error term of the migrant transfers equations, that is, that they can be treated as 
exogenous. The null hypothesis could not be rejected with robust Chi-Square statistics 
of 0.05 (p-value = 0.83) and 0.15 (p-value = 0.70) for IGAP and Y, respectively.18 
Since exogeneity could not be rejected, it is reasonable to expect the standard OLS 
estimates to be unbiased, consistent and efficient19 and therefore we proceed with 
these estimates.20   
 
 Regression results 
The results of the four different models are reported in Table 4 with our preferred 
model in the second, shaded column. In all cases the equations were estimated using 
OLS regression analysis, where the standard errors were calculated taking into 
                                                 
16 To test the validity of the instrument the Sargan overidentification test was used. This required the use of 
an additional instrument, the average household income in the community, which was also included in an 
alternative specification of the model. According to the Hansen J-statistic we could not reject the hypothesis 
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error process (p-value of 0.742 for the IGAP model and p-
value of 0.741 for the Absolute Income model). Reassuringly in these specifications the first-stage F-
statistics are also strong and exogeneity of the subjective income gap and household income variables could 
not be rejected. Results available from the authors on request. 
17 Statistic robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering. Since a community-level instrument is used, standard 
errors are clustered at the community level. 
18 The estimated coefficients using two-step efficient Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) models were 
also very similar to those reported for the linear OLS models in Table 4. See Appendix Table 1 for detailed 
results. 
19 Wooldridge, 2003, p.631; Wooldridge, 2002, p.223. 
20 Due to transfers being a censored variable, Tobit, rather than OLS models are commonly estimated. 
However, in this instance, given that less than 10% of households did not record receipt of migrant 
transfers, OLS models were estimated.  
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account a possible correlation of errors across households from the same community 
(PSU). The standard errors reported are the ‘robust’ Hubert/White-adjusted estimates.  
 
Table 4 OLS Regression Results for Transfers Models 
Dependent Variable Subjective Income Gap Model 
 
Absolute Income Model 
 
( Migrant transfers) Linear Spline Linear Spline 
Subjective Income Gap (IGAP)+ 0.057 
(0.088) 
-0.469*** 
(0.100) 
---- ---- 
Positive IGAP++ ---- 0.574*** 
(0.172) 
---- ---- 
Household Income+ ---- ---- 0.076 
(0.091) 
-0.263* 
(0.142) 
Income Above Threshold+++ ---- ---- ---- 0.358 
(0.229) 
Outer-island -1141.088*** 
(315.335) 
-773.377** 
(328.872) 
-1023.818*** 
(327.480) 
-1042.329*** 
(329.474) 
Household Size 54.271 
(82.554) 
4.035 
(78.268) 
28.913 
(95.439) 
78.062 
(79.127) 
Major Social Ceremony 2340.093 
(1402.913) 
2328.393* 
(1291.112) 
2256.793 
(1299.950) 
2328.158* 
(1327.350) 
Migration Status 3047.776*** 
(611.329) 
2970.423*** 
(583.973) 
3033.059*** 
(597.432) 
3029.220*** 
(581.992) 
Migrant Length of Stay -115.722** 
(50.146) 
-104.046** 
(50.263) 
-115.713** 
(48.515) 
-117.231** 
(49.431) 
US Migrant 538.081* 
(271.254) 
500.838* 
(253.129) 
533.929* 
(267.278) 
531.581** 
(255.280) 
Constant 1151.056** 
(496.3253) 
506.693 
(478.563) 
949.974* 
(518.473) 
1447.852** 
(582.887) 
No. Observations 500 500 500 500 
R2 0.182 0.251 0.197 0.209 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the community (PSU) level. 
*** significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
---- not applicable;  
+ in spline model coefficient 4β in equation (2) applies to households below the threshold level;  
++ Slope for households above the threshold level = sum of coefficients on IGAP and Positive IGAP 
or, 54 ββ +  in equation (2). 
 +++ Slope for households above the threshold level = sum of coefficients on Household Income and 
Income Above Threshold , or, 54 ββ +  in equation (2). 
 
On the one hand, the results reinforce the findings of Cox et al (2004) that failing to 
allow for the non-linearity of the relationship between recipient household welfare and 
transfers could lead to the conclusion that transfer motivations are exchange 
dominated. Under the mixed-motives model, we expect the coefficient on the variable 
for income below the threshold to be negative since altruism is the dominant motive 
for these households. This prediction is confirmed by the results of the spline model 
where we find in both specifications that the coefficients on income levels below the 
threshold level are negative and statistically significant, indicating the dominance of 
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altruistic motivations when recipient households’ income falls below the threshold 
level. Conversely, in both the IGAP and Absolute Income variants of the linear 
models, the signs on the income coefficients are positive, relatively much smaller, and 
are not statistically significant.  
 
On the other hand, the results also indicate that setting the knot-point using a 
theoretically justifiable and empirically estimated subjective threshold income level 
for each individual household, as opposed to one held constant across all households 
in the cross-section, provides results that are more consistent with the predictions of 
the mixed motives model, as shown by the graph of predicted transfers in Figure 2. 
 
P 
 
Figure 2 Predicted Transfers and the Subjective Income Gap 
 
In interpreting the results it should be noted that the coefficient 4β  in equation (2) 21 
gives the slope for households below the respective threshold level, while the sum of  
4β  and 5β 22 gives the slope for households above this threshold. Here, we expect the 
                                                 
21 The coefficient on IGAP and Household Income in the two models respectively 
22 The coefficient on Positive IGAP and Income Above Threshold. 
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slope for the latter to be positive, since exchange is predicted to be the dominant 
motive for the relatively well-off households.  
 
We find, first, that altruistically-motivated transfers appear to be substantially more 
responsive to household need when the subjective welfare measure (IGAP) is used (-
0.469) as opposed to absolute income (-0.263). Second, for income levels above the 
threshold, the subjective income gap model uncovers a statistically significant positive 
relationship with transfers, indicating that the exchange motive becomes dominant as 
predicted by the mixed-motives model. The estimated slope for the subjective income 
gap model is 0.105 (0.574 – 0.469). In contrast, the results for the Absolute Income 
model indicate that the coefficient on the Income Above Threshold variable ( 5β ), 
although also positive, is not statistically significant at conventional levels. This 
implies that when the threshold is set in terms of absolute income rather than our 
subjective need measure, linearity cannot be rejected in favor of a spline specification. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Our extension of the mixed-motive transfers model of Cox et al (2004) introduces a 
subjectively-assessed threshold income level providing a theoretically justifiable knot-
point for the spline model that can be measured through appropriate design of the 
survey instrument. When tested empirically this model produces results that are 
unambiguously more consistent with the mixed-motives model than the alternative, 
single-motive linear model. Our Subjective Income Gap model also uncovers a higher 
degree of responsiveness of altruistically-motivated transfers to recipients’ income for 
those households below the threshold in comparison with the Absolute Income model. 
This suggests that the crowding-out effect on private transfers of improved welfare 
levels among the poorer households might be stronger than previously estimated. 
 
Perhaps more interestingly, the uncovering of a statistically significant positive 
relationship for households above the threshold when applying the Subjective Income 
Gap model, suggests that a degree of crowding-in of private transfers, driven by the 
hypothesized exchange motive, applies to these households; in the Tongan case, 
approximately 10 cents for every additional dollar of recipient household income 
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above the threshold. It is noteworthy that when the Absolute Income model was tested 
the coefficient on the spline function above the threshold was not statistically 
significant, implying that with this formulation of the mixed-motives model the 
conventional linear model cannot be rejected in favor of a spline specification. 
 
Another implication of our findings, from a migrant-sending developing country 
perspective, is that any loss of potential migrant transfers, and therefore, of scarce 
foreign exchange inflows, arising from an improvement in welfare of the poorest 
could be offset by a compensating increase in transfers to households above the 
threshold. The extent to which this occurs will depend also on how the migrant 
households are distributed between those below and above the threshold welfare level. 
This also raises the possibility that effective poverty-alleviation policy interventions 
that reduce the proportion of households below the threshold, result in a shift in the 
distribution of private transfers in favor of the better-off households. This could also 
explain why poverty reduction is not always associated with reduced income 
inequality (Kanbur, 2005). 
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Appendix Table 1 IV Regression Results for Linear Transfers Models 
 
Dependent Variable  
( Migrant transfers) Subjective Income Gap Model 
 
Absolute Income Model 
 
Subjective Income Gap (IGAP) 
(Instrumented) 
0.032 
(0.115) 
---- 
Household Income 
(Instrumented) 
---- 0.031 
(0.111) 
Outer-island -1157.659*** 
(331.965) 
-1113.526*** 
(405.628) 
Household Size 51.803 
(84.196) 
40.328 
(89.869) 
Major Social Ceremony 2396.512 
(1402.913) 
2379.418 
(1554.686) 
Migration Status 3072.742*** 
(641.327) 
3074.51*** 
(637.75) 
Migrant Length of Stay -114.470** 
(48.217) 
-114.066** 
(47.722) 
US Migrant 528.638* 
(279.759 
523.874* 
(274.722) 
Constant 1167.227** 
(511.087) 
1087.646* 
(635.498) 
No. Observations 500 500 
R2 0.179 0.187 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the community (PSU) level. 
*** significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
---- not applicable;  
 
 
